Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 5

Issue 2

Article 2

1916

The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure
William H. Taft

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Courts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Taft, William H. (1916) "The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 5:
Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol5/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

WturtnclkUourna
ii'aw
VOL. V.

LEXINGTON, KY., OCTOBER, 1916

NO. :L

THE ATTACKS ON THE COURTS AND LEGAL PROCEDURE;
By Ex-President William H. Taft.*

One can not discuss the subject for tonight without considerable
embarrassment. The embarrassment arises from the danger of being
misunderstood in what one says in criticism of our present judicial
system and its workings, and having his criticisms used for purposes
and to sustain views which he would be the last one to approve. The
loud-and I may say the blatant-attack upon our judicial system
for the purpose of bringing about dangerous changes, instead of removing the grounds for real and just criticism, will only increase the
evil that justifies it. In order, therefore, to make clear what I have
to say, I shall first take up and answer the attacks upon the courts
that are not only unjust but dangerous ;and then state the real ground
for criticisms of their work and suggest what it seems to me, would
be effective remedies. There is a wave of popular demand for political
change in our state governments, and indeed in our national government, sweeping across the country, from West to East, which can
shortly be described as the substitution in our present democratic form
of government of more democracy, for the change from a Republican
representative system of government to one of direct and pure democracy, in which both legislative and executive functions are to be
exercised by the people without the intervention of skilled and educated representatives and executive agents. I do not intend to dis-.
*Delivered at Cincinnati Law School Commencement, May 23, 1914.
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cuss the error of this movement tonight. Tonight the subject is the administration of justice, and that requires a consideration only of the
application of this so-called further democratization of government
to its judicial branch. Whatever may be said of this radical change
proposed in executive and legislative governmental functions, the
difference between the nature of the judicial function and that of the
executive and the legislative functions, is so broad that even if the
reforms proposed for the latter were wise, they ought to have little or
no application to our judicial system. It may be well and truly said
that the legislative and executive action of government should follow
and manifest as nearly as may be the will of a majority of the people,
as expressed in. elections of legislative representatives and of executive
officers; but it is not true that the conduct of judges in the work they
have to perform on the issues presented to them should embody the will
of the people in the delivery of their judgments. It is true that it is their
function to enforce the legislative will of the people as expressed in the
constitution and in the statutory law and to apply it with uniformity
and equality and impartiality to all those affected by its provisions.
Recall of judges and recall of judicial decisions leading to the so-called
democratization of the courts, are destructive of the rights of the individual, take away the protection of the minority against the possible
injustice of the majority, and are a mere recurrence to the tyranny of
the Stuart Kings in their attempt to. subordinate the administration
of justice to their arbitrary will, except that the tyranny of the plurality of the electorate is to be substituted for the tyranny of one man.
The necessary tendency of such remedies is to destroy the supremacy
of the law.
A form of criticism which has been linked with the advocacy of
these radically erroneous and destructive proposals has been a form
of muckraking of the courts. Men have sought profit in the publication
of unfounded attacks upon the personal character of judges, upon the
subterranean influences that controlled them, which in these general
muckraking days has found a market and a credence among large
classes of people. Persons engaged in this work have not hesitated to
seize upon sentences written in just criticism of the courts as a basis
for such unjust slanders. I tbink fair-minded people concede that in
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view of the small salaries which have been paid the judges, in view
of the elective method of electing them which prevails in most states,
in view of the very great corruption that at times has existed in the
politics of the country, the freedom from venality among our judges
is something of which we as American people may properly feel proud.
This leads me, however, to emphasize a very necessary distinction.
Judges may be entirely free from venality and yet the method of
their selection and the character of their tenure of office may not give
us judges qualified by learning, skill, standing at the bar, and independence to render the best service. Criticism of the method of selection and of the character of the tenure is not an attack upon their
personality, but rather an impeachment of the system under which
they receive and hold their office. Comment upon this is not muckraking-it is a discussion of the wisest organization of the judicial
branch of the government.
The advocates of the new remedies attack the courts, first, because
it is said they occupy much too large a field in the government of the
country. They charge judges with legislating. They say that the
legislature should provide, in the discharge of its duty, statutory codes
covering the entire field of municipal law, simple and clear, so that he
that runs can read, and the courts should merely enforce as between
man and man and as between government and man this legislative will.
The theory of universal codification and declaration of law by a legislature and the elimination of the judicial function of statutory interpretation was advanced by Jeremy Bentham in the latter half of the
eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centry, and it found
many advocates. The present critics of the courts are only advancing
the same view that Bentham advanced, with very much less force
and utility, and at a time when our judicial system is not nearly so
subject to the severe criticism which the English judicial system deserved when Bentham wrote. Countries have attempted to carry out
Bentham's idea of codification and have sought as far as possible to
minimize the office of the judges in the application of the written law;
but they have utterly failed. In California it was attempted to cover
the whole field of jurisprudence by codes, and yet the decisions of
the courts in that state in their interpretation have been as many as in
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the states where no codes exist and the citation of adjudicated cases
in other states by California judgez to assist them in construing their
written law, is just as constant as in states where the Bentham idea has
not prevailed. Nor is this result confined to American courts acting
under the impulse and influence of common law precedent. The same
codification has been tried in France, yet the function of the French
courts seems to be growing wider and wider in statutory interpretation and in supplying defects of legislation. In other words, the
expression that Bentham coined for the purpose of attacking the office
exercised by the English court of his time, "judge-made" law, we may
now use to describe as a part of jurisprudence that can not be dispensed with in any civilized government. It is impossible for codes
to cover all the innumerable cases that arise in the transactions of
men by specific provision, even when those who legislate are most learned and skilled in existing law, most experienced in the world's affairs
and clothed with a knowledge enabling them to foresee as far as
possible the contingencies that may arise for the application of law
in the future. Nor are legislatures composed of men of this kind.
the simple truth is that the judge-made law so-called is essential to
the practical working of the written law. and the reconciling of its inconsistencies. There is no higher, no more useful, and no more indispensable function that the courts have to exercise. The danger of its
abuse is negligible because whenever the courts shall have thus wrongly
interpreted or supplemented the legislative will, it needs but a legislative act to correct the error.
The second criticism of the courts is that they have usurped the
sovereignty of the people in holding acts of the duly qualified legislative representatives of the people to be invalid because inconsistent
with the constitution of the state or of the United States. It is said
that they have interposed their own ideas of economics and of political
policy to strike down the expressed will of the people. When the system of writing constitutions was adopted, there were two theories.
The one was that the constitution in limiting the legislative function, the executive function and the judicial function was merely giving an admonition to those who were to exercise each as to the proper
limits of their authority, and that each branch of the government was
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the final arbiter as to what its authority was. The other was that the
limitations of the constitution were intended to be effective and that
the judicial branch in litigated cases coming before it, being charged
with the duty of declaring what the law was must decide whether
that which seemed to be a legislative act was in accord with the constitution as the fundamental law. To state it more exactly, the question for the court was whether the seeming legislative act was within
the permissible discretion of the legislature to determine what it might
do under the constitution; and if the court found the limits of that
permissible discretion have been exceeded, to refuse to recognize its act
as law.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Marbury v. Madison, that if an act of Congress was plainly in excess of
its powers under the constitution, the court must declare it invalid,
and a similar decision with reference to State legislation in Cohen v.
Virginia, aroused the indignation and vituperation of Thomas Jeffer-.
son, who was a popular leader of the widest influence at that time.
The court's view prevailed, however, and has prevailed down to the
present day, through many vicissitudes and against recurring attacks
of those supposed to be resistless leaders of the people. The same
view has come to be accepted throughout the British Empire under
Parliamentary constitutions given to the great British popular and
indepedent federations in Canada, in Australia and in South Africa;
the same is true in Argentina and other South American countries, and
these seems to be growing a feeling among the jurists of Europe that in
continental countries the same function should be vested in a high
court.
I am far from saying that there may not be instances in which
the courts have not given the consideration they ought to the strong
rule of pr'esumption in favor of the validity of that which the legislature has passed. Nor do I deny that at times they have followed their
own nice difference of opinion with the legislature as to the proper
construction of the constitution, instead of adhering to the rule that
only when the usurpation of power by the legislature is clear beyond
reasonable doubt can courts hold their acts invalid. But to say that
the courts have sometimes erred in this regard is only to say that all
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systems created by man are human. To predicate upon the statistics
showing how many laws have been set aside as invalid, the claim
that there has been a general abuse of power by the courts in these
cases is most unjust, because such a view ignores entirely the recklessness with which members of legislatures have refused to consider the
question of their powers at all, and have avowedly passed any law
that seemed popular and that would commend them to their constitutents on the plea that if the law was beyond their power, the
courts would so declare.
The third criticism of this class against judges and courts is that
in the application of the common law to new conditions, judges are out
of touch with social progress and reform. They are, it is said, rigid
and reactionary and fail to shape their so-called judge-made law to
hasten the steps of society to the better things that social reformers
plan. Indeed this is said to be true of our courts not only in the application of the common law, but also in their construction of constitutions and the interpretation of statutes. The proper discharge
of the difficult duties of courts requires as judges men of great ability,
wide experience, profound learning, independence and force of character, of nice discriminating judicial quality, and with the statesmanlike perception of the distinction between those fundamental principles
of law that must be constantly maintained and preserved in any
useful system of government and of the casual and temporary rules
of human conduct that may be changed from time to time as conditions
change, in the promotion of social justice and the pursuit of community happiness. Professor Pound, Mr. Warren and others have
shown that the criticism of courts as reactionary and as lacking in
response to the requirements of new conditions fnds justification
chiefly in the judgments of those courts whose judges are selected and
refained in office under a system of election and short tenures, a system which is not likely to secure in the judges the learning, experience,
ability and independence and impartiality that a life judiciary appointed by the chief executive affords. We could have no stronger
evidence, therefore, that the very faults that the advocates of recall
of judgs criticise in the courts are likely to be increased rather than
minimized by the so-called democratization of our judicial system.
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The truth is, the great tribunal, the greatest in the world, that interprets and enforces our Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court of the
United States, has shown itself peculiarily responsive in its interpretation of the fundamental law and of statutes and in its application of
the common law, to that settled public opinion and that prevailing
morality and that change of political and social conditions that should
be properly regarded by a court.
This is shown as fully as anywhere in the case of Holden v. Hardy,
in 169 U. S. The case presented a construction of that part of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which is the bulwark of
our liberties, providing as follows:
"No state shall make or enforce any law, shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, nor deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
In the above case, after reviewing the many cases under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Brown said:
"An examination of both these classes of cases under the Fourteenth Amendment will demonstrate that, in passing upon the validity
of state legislation under that amendment, this court has not failed
to recognize the fact that the law is, to a. certain extent, a progressive science; that in some of the states methods of procedure, which
at the time the constitution was adopted were deemed essential to the
protection and safety of the people, or to the liberty of the citizens,
have been found to be no longer necessary; that restrictions which had
formerly been laid upon the conduct of individuals, or of classes of
individuals, had proved detrimental to their interests; while, upon the
other hand, certain other classes of persons, particularly those engaged
in dangerots or uuhalthful employments, have been found to be in
need of additional protection."
After mentioning the great number of changes that had taken
place in the forms of procedure, he says:
"They are mentioned only for the purpose of calling attention to
the probability that other changes of no less importance may be made
in the future, and that while the cardinal principles of justice are
immutable, the methods by which justice is administered are subject
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to constant fluctuation and that the Constitution of the United States,
which is necessarily and to a large extent inflexible and exceedingly
difficult of amendments, should not be so construed as to deprive the
States of the power to so amend their laws as to make them conform
to the wishes of the citizens as they may deem best for the public welfare without bringing them into conflict with the supreme law of the
land.
"Of course, it is impossible to forecast the character or extent
of these changes, but in view of the fact that from the day Magna
Charta was signed to the present moment, amendments to the structure
of the law have been made with increasing frequency, it is impossible
to suppose that they will not continue, and the law be forced to adapt
itself to new conditions of society, and, particularly, to the new relations between employers and employes, as they arise."
What, then, are the just criticisms of our courts ? *What is the
cause of the popular discontent with the courts? We live in a state of
unrest and discontent. Part of it is healthy, and part of it is not. The
part that is healthy prompts to reasonable betterment by practical
means. The part, not healthy, prompts to a search for a royal road to
comfort, contentment, physical and mental, by legislation and without
individual effort, and by undue dwelling upon the rights of persons
and by undue ignoring of their duties. It does not prove that a system
should be destroyed or radically changed because its operation has
caased discontent among large classes of people. That discontent may
have been fanned by misrepresentation and demagogic appeal and
unfounded exploitation of nostrums and quack remedies which would
be futile to accomplish any good at all.
WVhat are grounds upon which the public have a right to complain? The chief grounds are first the delay in hearing and decision
of causes; and second the excessive cost of litigation, due first to such
delay and second to excessive fees and to the failure of the public to
assume a greater share of the expense of judicial administration. The
too great cost of litigation necessarily weighs upon the poor litigant
and makes for the advantage of the rich litigant. If we could remedy
the delay and reduce the cost of litigation, there would be very little
practical reason to complain of our judicial system. The difficulties,
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if any, growing out of alleged reactionary construction of the constitution, the interpretation of statutes or the application of the common law, can easily be remedied by legislative action or popular vote
in a machinery ready and at hand which with the people sufficiently
aroused can be made practically effective. The history of the Ives
case in New York in which the workman's compensation act of that
state was held by the Court of Appeals of that state to be invalid
under the constitution, and which was made the excuse for the proclamation of the remedy of recall of judicial decisions, shows the
efficacy of the remedy by constitutional amendment. The New York
constitution requires the approval of an amendment by successive
legislatures and a vote of the people at the polls. The people of New
York, by adopting the required amendment, have shown conclusively
the unreasonableness of a demand for such a grotesque, illogical and
dangerous remedy.
When we come, however, to the two defects of delay and excessive cost of litigation, we have a problem much less easy. The
enormous expansion of our population, of our commerce at home and
abroad, the tremendous increase in business and in the number of
transactions that call in the ordinary course of things for litigation
and resort to the courts, have swamped a system that was adopted in
more printitive times and was adapted to conditions of a people living
in rural rather than in urban communities. Where time does not seem
to have beeri so important, where trials in court were leisurely and
deliberate and were allowed to be such because they were part of the
entertainment and education of the people, the custom of delay
became so inveterate as to seem to inhere in any proper judicial system. We took our law and our procedure, much of it, from our English ancestors, and the course of our law has been very much influenced
by the course of English law and English procedure at a time when
English procedure was at its worst, both in respect to dispatch of
judgment and cost of litigation. When the Queen's Jubilee was celebrated in 1887, Lord Bowen, then a member of the House of Lords,
the Supreme Court of England, wrote an address for the purpose of
showing the progress that had been made in the administration of
justice between 1837 and 1887, the half century of Victoria's reign.
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His description of the utterly hopeless condition of civil judicial procedure and of the entirely ineffective machinery for the punishment of
crime at the time of the death of William IV., and the reforms that
had been wrought at the time he wrote, are most instructive, on the
one hand, and most encouraging, on the other. The administration of
English law at that time was a jumble. The law and equity courts applied different rules to the same case and offered different remedies
for similar wrongs. The two jurisdictions conflicted. The common
law courts refused to recognize claims and defenses which equity allowed, and judgments at common law were often nullified by injunctions obtained in equity. There was great uncertainty as to the proper
forum for a litigation. Suits in equity were constantly dismissed because there was a remedy at law, while complainants were disappointed
at law because they should have sued in equity, and even when a
litigant was in the right forum, he was driven to the other jurisdiction, and then had to come back again in order to obtain complete
redress. There were three courts of common law of concurrent jurisdiction, and although the volume of litigation had rapidly increased,
they sat only four short terms of three weeks each. Their procedure
was based upon a system of special pleading which inevitably promoted excessive technicality and consumed the energy of court and
lawyers and litigants in mere discussion of form. Just claims were
defeated by trivial errors in pleading, by unimportant variances between pleading and proof, while the outworn classification of forms
of action made a pitfall into which a man with a good cause often
fell. A fundamental rule of evidence excluded absolutely the testimony of all witnesses who had the remotest interest in the result, and
the rules of evidence were so carefully framed to exclude the falsehood
that very often truth itself was unable to force its way through the
barriers thus created. In consequence of the application of procedure
in equity to contentious and administrative business alike, persons who
really had no issue between them were compelled to engage in useless
contests. Equity pleadings like those at common law, were full of
tautology and technicalities. No litigant entering into a chancery
suit, with a determined opponent, could expect to live to witness its
termination.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Two great Lord Chancellors, Lord Selborne and Lord Cairns, were
able to secure, after an inquiry and report by a high commission of
the best lawyers of the realm, the passage of a general judicature act
that has worked a great reform. They established one court with departments of first instance, of appeal, intermediate and final, and with
most informal methods of taking appeals. They united together the
system of law and equity, so that when a man begins a suit he may
have either legal or equity relief, as the case he states justifies it, and
under most elastic rules of procedure both in civil and in criminal
cases it is not too much to say that no man can possibly lose his cause
on a technical point of procedure in England today and no guilty man
can escape by such means. A system of county courts, and with a
reasonable pecuniary jurisdictional limit with able lawyers at their
head, was established all over England. It was constituted in 1887
and 59 circuits, with 500 districts, a single judge being annexed to
each circuit. It has had such changes and increases as the needs of
the public business have required since. Real justice is thus administered in every" Englishman's backyard," as the saying is, promptly,
skillfully and fairly.
When the system is studied, the two great features of it are the
simplicity of its procedure and the elasticity with which that procedure and the use of the judicial force provided by Parliament can
be adapted to the dispostion of business. The success of the system
rests on the executive control vested in a council of judges to direct
business and economize judicial force, to mould their own rules of
procedure, and also on the learning, ability and experience of the individual judges and the consequent ease and quickness with which
they dispose of cases coming before them, so that in the great majority
of eases the judgment of the court is pronounced at the close of the
argument. This is generally true in courts of first instance, generally
true in the court of appeal, though not so frequently the case in the
House of Lords, or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the
supreme courts of appeal in the Kingdom and the Empire, where a
little more deliberation is had. I am bound to say, however, that in all
this reform, the evil of the expense of litigation in England has not
been completely remedied, though, of course, dispatch in the business
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has reduced it. The history of court reform in England contains lessons of profound importance to us in this country.
Let us begin with the Federal Judicial system. In this the appointment of judges for life prevails, and, therefore, on the whole the
average of judicial experience and ability is high. Congress has complete control over the procedure in such courts, in fixing the number of
judges, and in determining their jurisdiction. Congress has been very
derelict in this matter, than which there is none more important. From
time to time some remedial measure is adopted, but only by piecemeal. Some steps have been taken but nothing radical although the
subject calls for broad measures. The advantage law reformers had in
England was that the highest judicial officer of the realm, the Lord
Chancellor, was a member of the Cabinet, of the House of Lords and
of the Government controlling legislation, while the Attorney-General
and the Solicitor-General were also of the government and members
of the House of Commons and in both houses were also the leading
lawyers of the opposition and former Chancellors and Law Lords.
The best experts upon what was needed in the way of reform were
thus in places of legislative power and influence, to carry it into law.
Although Congress and the Senate especially has some lawyers of
high ability, they have no such influence as the leaders of the English
Bar have in Parliament.
I venture to recommend for our Federal system the following
reforms by Congressional action:
First-The antiquated system of a separation of law and equity
should be abolished. This indeed has been done in most of our states,
but not in the Federal Courts.
Second-The rules of procedure should be completely in control of the Supreme Court or a Council of Judges appointed by the
Supreme Court, and they should be rendered as simple as the English
rules of procedure are.
Third-The costs should be reduced to a minimum, and that as
far as possible they should be imposed upon the Government rather
than upon the litigants.
Fourth-Authority and duty should be conferred upon the head
of the Federal juidicial system, either the Chief Justice, or a council
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of judges appointed by him, or by the Supreme Court, to consider
each year the pending Federal judicial business of the country and to
distribute Federal judicial force of the country through the various
districts and intermediate appellate courts, so that the existing arrears
may be attacked and disposed of.
Fifth-There should be a reduction of the appeals to the
Supreme Court, by cutting down to cases of constitutional construction only the review as of right, and by leaving to the discretion of that
court, by writ of certiorari, the power to hear such cases from the
lower courts as it deems in the public interest.
Sixth-The Federal Workmen's Compensation Act should be
passed.
First-separation'of law and equity in the Federal Courts is not
by any means so obstructive as it was under the English system, because there they had separate courts and separate judges, and here
the hearing is in the same court, though in another case; and now the
court has power to send a case on the law docket to the equity docket
or the reverse. Nevertheless, it would be a great advance to have the
distinction wiped out, so that legal remedy or equitable relief, as the
facts may require, could be given in one law suit. It has been feared
that because the expression "Law and Equity" is used in the Federal
Constitution, there would be no power in Congress to unite the two
forms of action in one action. There may be an incidental remark in
an opinion of the Supreme Court sustaining such a view, but I am
quite sure that under present conditions, no such technical construction
of the constitution would be insisted upon by the court. Therefore,
either Congress itself ought to abolish the necessity for separate law
suits on the law and equity side of the court, or it ought to give the
Supreme Court power to do so in its rules of procedure.
Second-The elasticity which the power of the judges, or a controlling council of them, to make rules of procedure gives to the procedure, and the admirable simplicity that is thus produced, and the
avoidance of all technicalities, the English judicial system now abundantly demonstrates. This great reform for our Federal courts can be
effected by Congressional action in one session of Congress. I urged
this reform upon Congress, but though a bill is pending, nothing yet
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has been done. Congress is full of a certain kind of reformers; but there
is nothing about this real reform to win votes. Yet there is no more
real opportufiity for helping the people. Great statutes have been
passed, the Interstate Commerce Law, and the Anti-Trust Law, the
Pure Food Act, the White Slave Act, the Safety Appliance Acts, the
Employers' Liability Acts and others. The litigation of the Federal
courts has 'thus been greatly increased, but Congress is content to
dump all this business upon the courts and then give no attention to
providing the machinery for its prompt dispostion. There is too much
politics in Congressional reforms and not enough sincere effort and
efficiency.
Third-The third great step should be the adjustment of our judicial force to the disposition of the increasing business by introducing
into the administration of justice the ordinary business principles in
successful executive work, of a head charged with the responsibility of
the use of the judicial force at places and under conditions where the
judicial force is needed. We have in the entire United States say 120
Federal judges in courts of first instance, thirty judges of the intermediate appellate courts, with power to sit in the courts of first instance, and nine supreme judges, with power to sit either in the intermediate appellate courts or in courts of first instance. Now either
through the Chief Justice, and if he is to have the duty and responsibility he should have an adequate force of subordinates to enable
him to discharge it, or through a judicial committee of the judges,
the business of the United States Courts throughout the Union should
be considered each year, and assignments made of the judicial force to
various districts and circuits, with a view to the most economic use of
each judge for the disposition of the greatest amount of business by
him. In this way tab could, and would be, kept on individual efficiency
by the Supreme Court, and nothing would so stimulate effective work
of each judge in the reduction of arrears. Then if the judicial force
seems inadequate, then if business is not disposed of, it will be entirely
easy to know how many judges should be added and in what districts
and circuits they should be appointed. Now they are increased in a
most haphazard way, and other considerations than the public too
frequently enter into such legislation. Of course, the judges, district

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
and circuit, must be appointed primarily in particular districts and circuits; but already there has been introduced in a limited way the
practice of using judges from one circuit and one district in another,
and there is no reason why this principle should not be extended so
that the whole Federal judicial force of the country would be strategically employed, against the arrears of business, existing or probable.
Then with the simplicity of procedure, then with the giving adequate
sufficient force to the places where needed, we could have the dispatch of busiss that is essential to justice and that reduces much the
cost of litigation.
The plan of executive management of the judicial force and making the head of the court responsible for the disposition of all judicial
business is vindicated by the example of the Mlunicipal Court of
Chicago, where under the direction of a Chief Justice in a court of
limited jurisdiction but in a court of the people with a great mass of
judicial business of all sorts, the associate justices are massed at one
point or another in respect of the litigation pending so that the increased speed in the dispostion of cases is shown by the statistics to
be marked and most satisfactory.
Fourth-The expense of litigation is a serious burden in the
Federal Courts. The minimum limit of jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts is $3,000, and the assumption of the, judges and those who
have fixed fees in the past has been that litigants who have cases involving $3,000 are able to pay liberal costs. More than this, the
costs in the Federal courts were in times past regarded by the Supreme
Court as a means of decreasing the already too burdensome docket
that came to the Supreme Court by way of review. This is all wrong.
The growing importance of the Federal Courts to the people of the
country, by reason of the great additions to their business which the
new Federal statutes have made, requires that the same care should
be used to promote cheap litigation in those courts as in state courts.
The costs to poor inventors in patent suits on the equity side of the
court under the old system until a change in the equity rules, was outrageous, and it ought to be further greatly reduced. The clerks and
marshals are generally paid by salary as they ought to be, but there
is still maintained the theory that the costs earned should substantially
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contribute to meet the expenses. The fees should be reduced to a minimum. The necessary and inevitable cost of employing lawyers and
paying their expenses will itself prevent undue resort to courts and
will avoid that increase in unnecessary litigation that has sometimes
been used as an argument for the impostion of heavy fees.
Fifth-The Supreme Court has great difficulty in keeping up
with its docket. The most important function of the court is the construction and application of the constitution of the United States.
It has other valuable duties to perform in the construction of statutes
and in the shaping and declaration of general law, but if its docket
is to increase with the growth of the country, it will be swamped
with its burden, the work which it does will, because of haste, not
be of the high quality that it ought to have, and the litigants of the
court will suffer injustice because of delay. For these reasons the
only jurisdiction that it should be obliged to exercise, and which a
litigant may, as a matter of course, bring to the court, should be questions of constitutional construction. By giving an opportunity to litigants in all other cases to apply for a writ of certiorari to bring any
case from a lower court to the Supreme Court, so that it may exercise
absolute and arbitrary discretion with respect to all business but constitutional business, will enable the court so to restrict its docket
that it can do all its work, and do it well.
Sixth-I may here refer to another means of helping the administration of justice in the Federa" Courts. I mean the passage of
the Federal Workman's Compensation Act. Much time of 'Federal
District Courts is taken up with suits for damages by employes of interstate railways. The Workman's Compensation Act is intended to
remove from judicial cognizance the claims of the plaintiffs in such
cases and to submit them to an executive tribunal for adjustment,
under fixed rules of the act. It is a most commendable measure. It imposes a heavier total obligation upon the railroads than the present
statistics show that the railroads have to meet, but it results in a
uniform treatment of all the unfortunate who suffer injury in railroad
employment, and it eliminates the inequalities and the gambling
features of the present method of recovery. Now why is this measure
which has beeh prepared with great care by Senator Sutherland to
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meet constitutional and other objections, and which is the result of a
reasonable compromise between the representatives of organized labor
and the railroad managers delayed? It has passed the Senate, but it
is held up in the House, and for what reason? It is opposed by successful lawyers of great political influence in the present Congress, members of one body or the other, who do not wish to let go the opportunity
for large contingent fees in excessive verdicts. Yet these same lawyers
are tremendous reformers when it comes to matters in which they are
not themselves pecuniarily affected. But they will ultimately be beaten,
and when they are beaten the removal of this class of litigation from
the Federal Courts will give greater opportunity for dispatch of other
business and will I hope be a very substantial reform, not only in
bringing about more even justice and in helping all the unfortunate
employes of railways, but it will be a substantial step in judicial reform.
But judicial reform in the Federal Courts is only a step, though
I think an important step, as a model for the reform of the judicial
procedure throughout the country, because it is in the state courts that
the great volume of litigation is to be disposed of. The state courts
are the courts of the people generally, and in that judicial system
are courts of small jurisdiction, while, as I have already said, the
Federal Courts are limited in their consideration to civil cases involviiig $3,000 and upwards. Reform in the Federal jurisdiction is
easier in the fact that the selection and tenure of Federal judges by
appointment for life secures on the whole a higher average standard
in judges. Of course, we don't pay them adequate salaries. Lawyers
of large practice do not feel generally able to give up their practice
to take positions on the bench. In England the salaries are adequate
to a decent living for men holding such high judicial positions, and
the judicial place is therefore the ambition of all lawyers, and the
judicial place is the reward for professional learning, professional
character and professional success. But even with this difference, the
appointment and life tenure still give us a very high class of men for
Federal judicial positions, and sometimes, though they.may not be
pre-eminently qualified when they go upon the bench, the certainty
of tenure and the ambition for promotion and the experience they have,
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make them excellent judges after a few years. In the state courts, I am
sorry to say that the method of selecting the judges is, except in
Massachusetts and a few other states, by election. It is wonderful and
it shows the adaptability of the American people to neutralize bad
methods in government by theit common sense, that we have had
some great state courts and judges, and that on the whole the state
judiciary has been a great deal better than might have been expected
of the system. But the state and country primaries recently introduced
are quite likely to make our elective selection of judges even less satisfactory than heretofore. I don't know that we can hope that a change
will be made back to selection by appointment, but I am praying that
in states where the judges are still'appointed, the people may not lose
their sanity and take a retrograde step by changing to a system of
election,
Third-Another great difficulty in many of the states in the improvement of judicial procedure is the disposition to hamper the courts
by taking away the power of the judges. Great popular attacks are
made upon the courts for their failure to do what is expected of them,
and then from the very source from which these attacks come we find
pressure to minimize as far as possible the opportunity that judges
have to make the administration of justice in their courts effective.
A trial by jury at common law has been defined to be by the United
States Supreme Court a hearing before a competent judicial officer
and a jury of twelve men, in which the court instructs the jury as
to law, advises them as to the facts, the jury renders its *erdict upon
their independent judgment of the facts and the court has power to
set aside the verdict if manifestly unjust. The distrust of judicial
power has been such that one of the great obstructions to justice in
our state courts is the statutory devestiture of the judge of his authority in a jury trial and the transfer of the control of the trial in such
eases to the irresponsible action of shrewd and eloquent counsel, able
to make the worse appear the better reason, whether engaged for one
side or the other. This has the tendency not only to reach emotional,
unjust and wrong results, but it drags out the trial far beyond what is
necessary. This is shown in the fact that a cause which takes but one
day or part of a day in England, takes here in a state court a week,
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and a cause which may take three or four days or a week in England
will take here a month or a month and a half. This is due both to the
paralyzing of the judicial arm, the exalting of the power of the jury
and of the counsel, and also to the lack of learning, experience, sil
and prestige of the judge.
The third difficulty in the state courts has been the effect to improve procedure by constant tinkering with it and constant provisions
for detail, which should all be left to the elastic rules adopted by
judges. One of the great examples of the absurd pursuit of the idea
that legislation can properly take care of everything and leave nothing to the judges, is such an enormous code or procedure as they have
now in the state of New York, an obstruction to facility in judicial
work, and a reflection upon the intelligence of successive legislatures in
our greatest state.
Fourth-Another difficulty with the present state judicial system
is the assumption that the suits between poor men should be decided
by poor judges. We have had through the country a system of civil
courts conducted by men who are not lawyers, by justices of the peace,
-with appeals from the justice's court to the common pleas court, or
superior court of first instance, and then with appeals through intermediate courts of appeal to the Supreme Court. If a system could be
devised that offered greater advantage to the wealthy litigant in resisting the claims of the poor litigant, I don't know what it is. The
justices of the peace generally have very little knowledge of the law,
are not men of skill and learning, able to dispose of business promptly
and accurately, and so the cases too frequently drag along in the socalled "people's courts" until the poor litigant is discouraged and
really defeated, even when he wins in a court of last resort. The
poorer people are entitled to as good judges as the rich, and they can
not get them by giving them an appeal to the highest court in their
cases, because that involves such delay and expense. The cutting off appeals from the people's courts to the Supreme Court is one means of
preventing that inequality between the poor and the rich litigant that
now prevails. The proper reform is the one pursued in England in
the county court system, and in the Municipal Court in Chicago, by
which competent lawyers properly paid are given the power to hear
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and dispose of small causes. This is a lesson from the English system
of judicature that ought to be deeply graven on the hearts of state
judicial reformers.
Fifth-Then, of course, the same system that I have recommended for the Federal judiciary ought to be adopted in the state courts
by which all the superior courts in the state should be made into one
court, with an executive head, with a council of judges to prepare rules
of procedure, and with executive control to distribute the judicial
force of the State in such a way as to meet the varying demands for
that force in various districts of the state. All this can be impressed
upon the state legislatures and the lawyers of the various states who
have influence with the legislatures by a proper reform in the Federal
judiciary as a model.
One great difficulty that is facing us in this country is the lack
of respect for law and the weakened supremacy of the law. The idea
seems to be growing that any small class that has some particular reform which it wishes to effect in its own interest may accomplish
that by force and by threats of force against the whole body politic
and social. In other words, physical force and lawless violence under
this government of law is growing to be a calculated element in the
winning of political and social issues. Now if this continues, the bonds
of society will be loosed and hope of real progress, social or political,
must be abandoned. The militancy of the Suffragettes in England,
the threat of rebellion in Ulster, the dynamite of certain trades-unions
in California, in Colorado and in Indianapolis, are all instances of
what I mean; and now certain leaders of organized labor are demanding that the equitable arm of the Federal courts of justice by
injunction to protect business and property against lawless injury in
labor controversies shall be paralyzed.
The attempt to hamper a court of equity in enforcing injunetions is a retrograde step in law. At common law the theory was that
civil courts had no means of preventing injury and wrong. The only
remedy they could offer was damage after the wrong had been done,
and, of course, pecuniary damages were often a very inadequate
remedy. Courts of equity, by working upon his conscience, restrained
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him who proposed to do the wrong from doing it. This was a long
step, in the direction of good morals and peace and order.
Injunctions are now to be forbidden in certain cases affecting certain classes of our citizens if labor leaders have their way. Criminal
statutes that ought to have general and uniform operation are to except from their penalties the same privileged classes. Further to
give reign to lawlessness the power of courts is to be weakened by
a provision that no court can enforce its deliberate judgment made
after full hearing against a defiant and disobedient defendant, until
a jury has been called after judgment to decide that he is disobedient.
This gives a defeated litigant. the opportunity to have a judgment or
decree carefully rendered, reviewed by a jury with every opportunity
to appeal to emotion, prejudice and irrelevant circumtances. This
is a recall of judicial decisions in miniature, but in its way quite as
dangerous an innovation. Let us hope that there may be sufficient
courage in the National Legislature to prevent such a sapping of the
foundations of society. Why should not the time of Congress be devoted to the interest of all the people and the promotion of judicial
procedure for all litigants instead of devoting so much time to a particular class? We hear a good deal about undue privilege, and I am
not here to deny that our civilization has suffered much in that regard in the interest of large and grasping corporations, but that is
not any reason why we should enthrone another class in special privilege, give it immunity under a general law and deny effective remedy
from the wrongs it wishes to inflict.
What I have been saying has had more especial reference to the
disposition of civil litigation, although much of it applies to the
prompt and effective enforcement of criminal law. In the Federal
courts, I do not think that there is much if any ground for criticism of
the speedy and proper trial of criminal cases. The judges have their
proper function and help the jury, and prevent counsel from taking
the helm. Wrongdoers fear an indictment in the United States
Courts for this reason.
In the state courts, at least in the west and south, the lax administration of criminal justice is deplorable. This is in part due to the
lax sentiment of the people on the subject and in part to the transfer
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of authority and importance in the trial from the judge to the jury
and the counsel. The delays are due to this and to the making of
minute rules of procedure, the too rigid rules of evidence and the
strict restraint upon the judge's reference to evidence, a trap in which
to catch the trial court on a writ of error. Endless proceedings follow,
especially if the defendant is able to pay for it. The public is tired.
The court is tired. The prosecution is tired. And the escape of the
guilty defendant or his inadequate punishment which is too often the
result is demoralizing to society and does not restrain future violation of law.
The trial by newspaper is a danger that some method ought to be
devised to prevent. It does not conduce to justice. It creates a false
atmosphere in the courtroom.
Simplicity of procedure and dispatch of trial will do much to obviate the greater defects. Then if appellate courts could be given
power to say that an error committed in the trial is not ground for
reversal unless it shall affirmatively appear from the record that a just
result was not reached, technicalities would cease to be useful as an
obstruction to justice.
I do not despair of substantial judicial reform. I think the lawyers of the country are aroused to the necessity of taking away from
the enemies of constitutional government and the institutions of civil
liberty, the only real arguments that they have against our judicial
system by promoting dispatch in the dispostion of litigation and reducing the cost thereof to the poor litigant.
0

EX POST FACTO LAWS.
To What Extent are Laws Valid That Admit Different or Other
Evidence Than Was Permissible at the Time of the
Alleged Act?
The writer is acquainted with the high character and legal standing
of the late Justice Harlan of Kentucky, and appreciates his valuable
services as a jurist, but earnestly desiring to have a correct understand-

